Abstract: This paper investigates bundle pricing under imperfect competition. In a multiproduct context, we first examine how substitution/complementarity relationships among products can affect pricing. This is used to motivate multi-product generalizations of the HerfindahlHirschmann index (GHHI) capturing cross-market effects of imperfect competition on bundle pricing. The GHHI model is applied to pricing of conventional and patented biotech seeds in the US from 2000-2007. One major finding is that standard component pricing in biotech traits is soundly rejected in favor of sub-additive bundle pricing. This result is consistent with the presence of scope economies in the production of genetic traits. The econometric estimates show how changes in market structures (as measured by both ownand cross-Herfindal indexes) affect U.S. corn seed prices.
Introduction
There has been much interest in the pricing of bundled goods by multiproduct firms.
Three types of bundle pricing have been analyzed: component pricing where each component is priced separately and the effective price of products is the sum of their components; pure bundling where consumers are restricted to buy either a fixed bundle of components or nothing at all; and mixed bundling where products are offered both bundled and unbundled, each being priced separately. The industrial organization literature has examined how bundling and bundle pricing can help firms exercise market power under imperfect competition. This includes the price discrimination effects of bundling as a strategy to exploit heterogeneity of consumer preferences (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee 1984 , McAfee et al. 1989 Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003; Fang and Norman 2006; Gans and King 2006) . It also includes the use of bundling strategies as means of deterring entry or driving out rivals (e.g., Whinston 1990; Choi 1996; Carlton and Waldman 2002; Nalebuff 2004 Nalebuff , 2005 Shi 2008a; Peitz 2008) .
In general, which bundling strategy is better from the firm's viewpoint depends on the situation considered (Adams and Yellen 1976; McAfee et al. 1989; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003; Fang and Norman 2006) . Bundling can be motivated from the supply side in the presence of economies of scope (Adams and Yellen 1976) . It can also be motivated from the demand side.
When products are valued independently (i.e., when consumers' reservation value of a bundle is the sum of the reservation values of each component), McAfee et al. (1989) has shown that pure component pricing does not dominate if reservation values are independently distributed among consumers. And when purchases can be monitored, mixed bundling dominates (at least weakly) other bundling strategies (which can be seen as special cases of mixed bundling).
Going beyond the case where consumers' reservation values of components are independent, Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) investigated the role of complementarity/ substitution in bundling decisions by a monopoly. By definition, components are complements (substitutes) when the reservation value of a bundle is super-additive (sub-additive) in the value of its components. They document how both degree of complementarity/substitution and production cost affect optimal bundling decision and pricing. They find that pure bundling dominates under strong complementarity regardless of cost levels. Pure component strategies are likely to dominate for substitutes, especially when production cost is high. And mixed bundling can dominate for weak substitutes or weak complements when production cost is low.
The implications of price discrimination for efficiency have been examined extensively in the literature (e.g. Schmalensee 1981; Holmes 1989; Corts 1998 and Armstrong and Vickers 2001) . There are scenarios where bundling strategies can reduce the adverse effects of exercising market power (Adams and Yellen 1976; Brennan 2005; Shi 2008a ). Also, if bundling strategies are motivated from the supply side in the presence of economies of scope, the production of multiple outputs by a single firm can reduce production cost and improve efficiency.
The empirical assessment of bundling and bundle pricing under imperfect competition raises significant challenges due to lack of data and a gap between theory and empirical validation of bundling. 2 We confront these challenges in three interdependent ways. First, we develop a model of bundle pricing under quantity setting games. In a multiproduct context, we show how the substitution/complementarity relationships among products with different sets of bundled characteristics can affect pricing. This is used to motivate multi-product generalizations of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (hereafter GHHI), which capture cross-market effects of imperfect competition on bundle pricing. Second, the GHHIs are introduced in an econometric analysis of the determinants of bundle pricing. To our knowledge, this is the first econometric investigation using GHHI to estimate the linkages between imperfect competition and multiproduct pricing. The model also allows for a test of standard component pricing. Third, we present an empirical application to the US corn seed market. The econometric estimates provide useful information on interactions between bundling and market power.
The corn seed market presents a great case study for the analysis of bundling and bundle pricing under imperfect competition. Genetically modified (GM) corn acres account for about 80 percent of the total US corn acreage in 2007. GM corn seeds include patented genetic traits (such as insect resistance and/or herbicide tolerance) produced by biotech firms. These traits can be introduced into the seed either separately, or bundled together when multiple genetic traits are "stacked". In this context, bundled GM seeds refer to seeds with stacked genetic traits.
The last decade has seen a rapid rise in bundling in the US corn seed market. As documented below, the proportion of US corn acres planted with stacked seeds has gone from 2.1 percent in 2000 to 56.2 percent in 2007. Also, there has been a sharp increase in the number of traits being bundled. Single trait GM corn seeds were first commercialized in 1996. Two years later the double stacked corn seed (i.e. seed with two genetic traits) was introduced, followed by the introduction of the triple stacked system (i.e. the bundling of three traits), and then the quadruple stacked system in around 2006. Moreover, corn seeds with eight traits are expected to be released by Monsanto and Dow AgroScience by 2010 or sooner.
The increased use of genetically modified and patented corn seeds has been associated with changing structure in the seed markets. After a flurry of horizontal and vertical mergers in the 1990s, the corn seed industry is now dominated by a few large biotech firms (FernandezCornejo 2004) . According to Graff, Rausser and Small (2003) , these mergers have been motivated in part by the complementarities of assets within and between the agricultural biotechnology and seed industries. This indicates that seed bundling can be associated with cost reductions obtained from capturing economies of scope in the production of genetic traits. But bundling can also be part of a product differentiation strategy and price discrimination scheme intended to extract more profit from farmers facing varying agro-climatic conditions. In this context, increased market concentration has raised concerns about adverse effects of imperfectly competitive pricing and the strategic use of bundling (Fulton and Giannakas 2001; FernandezCornejo 2004) . These issues suggest a need to investigate empirically the economics of GM seed pricing and bundling.
Our econometric analysis quantifies the linkages between seed bundling, changes in market concentrations, and corn seed pricing. For bundled biotech traits, we reject standard component pricing of corn seed. We find strong evidence of sub-additive bundle pricing, which is consistent with price discrimination strategies and scope economies in the production of bundled seeds. We also find evidence of spatial price discrimination. The analysis captures the interactive role of market concentrations and complementarity/substitution in demand. We document how traditional and cross-market effects of imperfect competition affect seed prices. This is done by estimating Lerner indexes which provide useful information on departures from marginal cost pricing. Our analysis also illustrates how changing market structures (e.g., from mergers) can affect seed prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework of multiproduct pricing under imperfect competition. It develops a Cournot model introducing the GHHIs capturing cross-market effects of imperfect competition. Section 3 provides an overview of the US corn seed market. Section 4 presents our econometric model of seed pricing, where the GHHIs reflect the exercise of market power. The estimation method and econometric results are discussed in section 5. Sections 6 and 7 report the empirical findings and evaluate their implications. Finally, section 8 concludes.
The Model
Consider a market involving a set {1,.. Assuming a Cournot game and under differentiability, the profit maximizing decision of the n-th firm for the m-th output satisfies
Equation (1c) is the complementary slackness condition. It applies whether the m-th output is produced by the n-th firm ( > 0) or not ( = 0). This is important for our analysis: reduces fixed cost (Baumol et al., 1982, p. 75) . A relevant example is the case of an R&D investment contributing to the joint production of and . 
which can be alternatively written as
where is the aggregate output of the k-th product, and
Equation (3) Note that equation (3) applies to general multiproduct pricing in a Cournot game under imperfect competition. It includes as a special case the pricing of bundled goods differentiated by their characteristics. In a way consistent with previous research (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003; Fang and Norman 2006) , it shows that the exercise of market power in bundling and bundle pricing can be complex. This indicates a need to assess empirically how the bundling of product characteristics interacts with market structures to affect pricing. This issue is explored next in the context of the evolving market for US corn seeds.
The US Corn Seed Market
Our analysis relies on a large, extensive data set providing detailed information on the US The survey is stratified to over-sample producers with large acreage.
6 Thus, the DMR survey is not a true panel as the farm composition of the sample changes over time.
7 A crop-reporting district (CRD) is defined by the US Department of Agriculture to reflect local agroclimatic conditions. In general, a CRD is larger than a county but smaller than a state. 8 Due to the fast turnover in the seed market, farmers may try new varieties every year, thus would purchase more than one variety seed for their field. In addition, the US EPA requires that farmers maintain at least 20% of their cropland for non -"insect resistant" varieties. Starting in the 1930s, the development and diffusion of hybrid corn transformed the US seed industry and contributed to the dominant role played by private seed companies. With advances in breeding technology (including biotechnology) and institutional changes in the intellectual property protection of life forms since the 1980s, many small seed firms exited the market, and the seed industry is now dominated by few large companies (Fernandez-Cornejo 2004) . The DMR data show that about 300 seed companies operate in the US corn seed market.
However, only six biotech firms are involved, 10 four of which own subsidiary corn seed companies.
11
Currently there are two major groups of genes/traits in the GM seed market: insecticide resistance designed to reduce yield damages caused by insects; and herbicide tolerance designed to reduce yield reductions from competing plants (weeds). For corn, the insect resistance traits focus on controlling damages caused by two insects: the European corn borer (ECB), 12 and rootworms (RW). 13 In corn biotech seeds, this means incorporating the Bt gene against the ECB, and the Bt gene against RW. 14 The herbicide tolerance (HT) traits work with corresponding herbicides. After adopting the HT traited seed technology, farmers can apply the relevant herbicide to the field, which kills the weeds without damaging the traited crop. Some biotech 10 They are: Monsanto, Syngenta, Dow AgroSciences, DuPont, Bayer CropScience, and BASF.
11 While one of the two firms has already entered the cotton seed market, the DMR data show that it has not entered (yet) the US corn seed market. 12 The European corn borer is a major pest of corn in North America and Europe. Yield loss due to ECB has been estimated to average about five percent, although damages can vary widely both over time and over space. 13 Yield loss due to corn rootworms damages average around five percent in the US, amounting to about $800 million of reduced income for US corn growers. 14 Bt is shorthand for a common soil bacterium called Bacillus thuringiensis. It also refers to the insecticide produced by a gene from these bacteria. In Bt corn, modified versions of this gene are introduced in corn plants where they kill selective insects.
seeds contain only one of these traits, while the bundled seeds contain multiple traits from some combination of the two groups of traits. The information presented in figure 1 and table 1 is at the national level, which masks important spatial market differences. For example, while single-trait biotech seeds had a US market share of 30% in 2000, the DMR data show that conventional seeds still dominated many local markets. And while the US conventional seed's market share was 20.6% in 2007, some local markets were completely dominated by biotech seeds. This indicates the presence of spatial heterogeneity in the US corn seed market. As shown below, such heterogeneity also applies to seed prices. 
Econometric Specification
Our analysis of the determinants of corn seed prices builds on equation (3). As derived, equation (3) is a structural equation reflecting the determinants of pricing under imperfect competition in a multi-product framework. As discussed in section 2, fixed cost can generate economies of scope. Economies of scope are relevant here as R&D investment likely generates synergies in the production of bundled/stacked seeds. This would in turn affect bundle pricing.
Also, the effects of imperfect competition on price can be expected to depend on the nature of substitution/complementarity across bundles. Below, we specify a modified version of (3) that reflects the effects of both bundling and market power on corn seed price.
Consider for the case of seeds exhibiting different genetic characteristics. Partition the set of seeds into mutually exclusive types. Let K i ∈ {0, 1} be a dummy variable for a seed of the i-th 
We start with a standard model in which each purchase observation is at farm-variety level and the price of a seed varies with its characteristics (e.g., following Rosen 1974) . The price p represents the net seed price paid by farmers (in $ per bag). Consider the hedonic equation representing the determinants of the price p for a seed of characteristics 1 2 { , ,..., }:
where X is a vector of other relevant covariates, and ε is an error term with mean zero and constant variance. In equation (5a), is a dummy variable for double-stacking the i-th and j-th genetic type, with if ,
, and 1, 0 for otherwise
are dummy variables representing respectively triplestacking and quadruple-stacking.
for otherwise
In cases where the market is void of bundling/stacking of multiple traits, the dummy 
implying that they are perfectly collinear with the intercept. To deal with this issue below, we set δ 1 = 0 in (5a), meaning that the intercept reflects the price of conventional seeds and that the other δ parameters measure price differences relative to conventional seeds.
This could happen under two scenarios. First, this could be associated with economies of scope on the production side, if the joint production of bundled goods leads to a cost reduction that gets translated into lower bundle price. Second, this could be associated with price discrimination on the demand side, if discounting the price of a bundled good can help increase firm profit. In general, equation (5a) provides a framework to analyze the nature of bundle pricing.
Next, as shown in equation (3), we introduce market power effects in (5a) by specifying
where is the HHI ( being the market share of the n-th firm in the market for the i-th seed type), measuring market concentration related to the i-th characteristic. We further
where Since HHI and the GHHI's are zero under competitive conditions, it follows from equations (4) and (5a)-(5c) that the effect of market power on price is given by
In a way similar to equation (4), equation (6) ( 1, 1, and 1) Including source of purchase as an explanatory variable in (5a) captures possible price discrimination schemes affecting the seed price paid by farmers.
The market share of biotech seeds has increased significantly during the years of our study (see figure 1) . In many cases, we found "entry" and "exit" in some local markets. Note In order to investigate whether entry/exit may affect seed prices beyond the H's and HH's effects, we also introduce entry/exit variables in the specification (5a). In our data, we observe local exits in the conventional seed ( ) markets. We also observe local entry in the HT1 trait ( ) markets, the Bt ECB trait ( ) markets and the Bt RW trait ( ) markets. To capture entryexit effects on seed price, the following binary terms are included in the model: when Table 2 reports summary statistics of key variables used in the analysis. The mean values of H ii 's show that the conventional seed markets exhibit greater competition than the biotech trait markets. For the 91 CRDs covering the eight years of our data, the average conventional seed HHI is 0.258. This is over 40% above the Department of Justice's threshold of 0.18 for identifying "significant market power". Each CRD is presumed to represent the relevant market area for each transaction; thus, all H terms are calculated at that level. Conducting market concentration analysis at the CRD level seems relevant as farmers typically buy their seeds locally and seed varieties vary with local agro-climatic conditions. 17 We observe significant changes in the H's both across regions and over time. This reflects the fact that the corn seed market has undergone dramatic structural changes over the last decade. Our analysis of the 16 Note that we do not construct an event dummy for as we do not observe any pattern of entry or exit for this trait. determinants of seed prices both over time and across space provides useful information on the effects of these changes. One econometric issue in the specification (5a)-(5c) is the endogeneity of the H's. Both market concentrations (as measured by the H's) and seed pricing can be expected to be jointly determined as they both depend on firm strategies in the seed market. To the extent that parts of the determinants of these strategies are unobserved by the econometrician, this would imply that the H's are correlated with the error term in equation (5a). In such situations, least-squares estimation of (5a)-(5c) would yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates (due to endogeneity bias). The solution is to consider estimating equation (5a)-(5c) using an instrumental variable (IV) estimation method that corrects for endogeneity bias. To address this issue, we first test for possible endogeneity of the H's using a C statistic calculated as the difference of two Sargan statistics (Hayashi 2000, p. 232 Stock and Yogo (2005) , this indicated again that our analysis does not suffer from weak instruments. Table 3 reports the IV regression results from our model using 2SLS method, with heteroscedastic-robust standard errors under clustering. We will first discuss the price impacts associated with introducing single biotech traits. This builds toward a broader assessment of the more complex issues related to the marginal price impacts derived from the stacking of traits and from the role that market power has shifting rent between farmers and the seed industry. In 20 Note that, since our model is just identified, the Hansen over-identification test is not applicable. 21 Note that the Kleibergen-Paap test is a better choice compared to the Cragg-Donald test for weak instruments: the former remains valid under heteroscedasticity (while the latter one does not).
Estimation

Empirical Results
section 7, simulations of the Illinois corn seed market provides additional insights about the interactive forces that derive from biotechnology.
Characteristics effects
Compared to conventional seeds, the results show that the insertion of single biotech traits led to sizeable seed price premiums in three of the four traits considered. The coefficients of the terms (Bt ECB), (Bt RW) and (HT2) are each positive and statistically significant. They are respectively $23.31, $25.72, and $7.38 per bag, suggesting the presence of significant premiums for these biotech traits. The coefficients of (HT1) and (HT2) differ, providing evidence of differences between the two herbicide-tolerant traits HT1 and HT2. The coefficient of (HT1) is negative and statistically significant. However, note that the K's also appear in interaction with the H's and HH's in (5a)-(5c). This means that coefficients of the K's alone provide only partial information on how prices vary across seed types. The magnitude of the price premium across seed types will be analyzed in more detail in section 7.
The coefficients of the terms and provide useful information on the effects of bundling on seed price. All 11 of the stacking coefficients are negative, and all but are statistically significant. As discussed in section 4, component pricing is associated with the null hypothesis that all stacking coefficients are zero. Using a Wald test, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of stacking effects are all zero is strongly rejected. This provides convincing evidence against component pricing of biotech traits in the corn seed market. The negative and significant stacking effects also indicate the prevalence of subadditive pricing of corn seed in their individual components. Subadditive pricing may be driven by price discrimination associated with demand heterogeneity (higher prices being associated with more inelastic demands). But the fact that all of the stacking coefficients are negative indicates the likely
presence of economies of scope in the production of bundled/stacked seeds. This would be consistent with synergies in R&D investment (treated as fixed cost) across stacked seeds. For example, a given R&D investment can contribute to the production of multiple seed types, meaning that bundling can help reduce the overall cost of producing seeds. In this context, the subadditivity of prices would reflect the fact seed companies share with farmers at least some of the benefits of scope economies.
Market concentration effects
The model incorporates market share information about each of the trait using the traditional Herfindahl indexes along with generalized cross-Herfindahl indexes as given in equations (5a)-(5c). Here, we discuss the partial effects of concentration and withhold a global assessment of market concentration until section 7. Pennsylvania ($3.93), and Indiana ($3.70). This shows that the main corn-producing states in the Corn Belt charge more for corn seeds (e.g., Illinois or Iowa). This is consistent with corn belt farmers generating greater farm benefits from high-performing corn seeds under favorable agroclimatic conditions. It also suggests that seed companies do price discriminate across regions, reflecting spatial differences in elasticities of demand for seeds.
Purchase source effects:
Recall that most farmers purchase seed from "Farmer who is a dealer or agent" (33%), followed by "Direct from seed company or their representatives" (29.4%), and "Myself, I am a dealer for that company" (15.7%). Compared to purchasing from "Farmer who is a dealer or agent", "buying directly from a seed company or their representative" costs about $4.59 less, while purchasing from "myself" costs about $3.89 less. These results may reflect the effect of farmer's bargaining position, but also possibly the presence of price discrimination across different modes of purchase.
Other variables: The exit and entry dummies are all negative but none are statistically significant. The entry dummies have relatively higher confidence levels, 81.2% for Entry3, 85.9% for Entry2, and 89.7% for Entry4, than that of the Exit1 dummy (26.3%). Before the biotech seed's entry, seed price tends to be lower. So the introduction of biotech seed may raise the price for all seeds, including the conventional varieties. This result is consistent with the finding in Shi (2008b) , where she argues that the introduction of biotech seed can raise the conventional seed price.
The farm size effect is statistically significant: large farms within each state pay more for corn seeds. This result is likely due to the fact that large farms are more productive than smaller farms and thus are willing to pay more for seeds. The farm size variable appears to capture another form of price discrimination used by seed companies in negotiating prices to individual clients. The time trend effect is positive and statistically significant. Seed price goes up on average by $1.89 per year. Given that the mean price is about $98, this gives a 1.93% increase a year, slightly less than the inflation rate over the same time period. 23 Therefore, in real terms, the seed price is decreasing over years, ceteris paribus, 24 reflecting technological improvements in the corn seed industry. a Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level. b The centered R 2 is 0.40, and un-centered R 2 is 0.96. c Results for the location effects and purchase source effects are not reported here to save space, but are discussed in the text.
Implications
In this section, our empirical estimates are used to generate insights on bundle pricing, and the interactive role of market power within and across markets on seed pricing. For illustration purpose, our analysis focuses on Illinois in 2004. Illinois is one of the largest cornproducing states in the US, and it has the largest number of farms in our sample. The year 2004 is a convenient choice: it is in the middle of our sample period; and it avoids entry/exit events for different traits. 
Simulation of bundling effects
The bundling literature has identified situations where component pricing may not apply (e.g., when the demands for different components are correlated, or when consumers are heterogeneous in at least a subset of the component markets a Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level.
Estimated Lerner indexes
As discussed in sections 2 and 4, the Lerner index provides a simple characterization of the strength of imperfect competition: it is zero under marginal cost pricing, but positive when price exceeds marginal cost. The market power component M in equation (6) Table 5 for selected seed types.
The Lerner indexes are statistically significant at the 10 percent level in five cases (out of eight cases). 27 When significant, the Lerner indexes are always positive, with estimates of (100 × L) varying from 2.25% for conventional seeds ( ) to 21.14% for HT1 . This provides empirical evidence that market power affects seed prices. The effect of market power on price is found to be moderate in the conventional seed market , but larger in the HT1 market. Also, this effect is found to be significant and fairly large in the bundled-seed markets involving HT1, with (100 × L) equal to 14.39 for (Bt-ECB and HT1), 17.62 for (Bt-RW and HT1), and 15.32 for (Bt-ECB, Bt-RW and HT1). Finally, the Lerner indexes are not statistically different from zero for (Bt-ECB) and (Bt-RW). Thus, our analysis does not find empirical evidence that market power has a significant effect on seed prices in these two sub-markets.
Cases involving the trait are dropped due to lack of variation in the market concentration in market. a Lerner indexes are calculated from prices at the mean GHHI levels compared to the case of competition (GHHI=0) b Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level.
Effects of changing market structure
In equation ( Table 6 . Table 6 presents the price effects of selected merger scenarios. Scenarios 1-3 consider mergers between biotech companies within a given genetic trait market (biotech/biotech within trait). This covers mergers of biotech firms within the Bt-ECB market (scenario 1), within the Bt-RW market (scenario 2), and within the HT1 market (scenario 3). In each case, the simulations assume that the merger leads to a monopoly in the corresponding market (with a market share equal to 1). 28 In scenarios 1-3, Table 6 shows that the effect of such mergers on seed price would not be statistically significant for Bt-ECB and Bt-RW. However, the effect is statistically significant for HT1. Our simulation results show that mergers of biotech firms in the HT1 markets could potentially induce a price increase of up to $23.44/bag of HT1 seed.
Scenarios 4-6 consider mergers between biotech companies producing different genetic traits (biotech/biotech across traits). This covers mergers of biotech firms involved in Bt-ECB and Bt-RW markets (scenario 4), in Bt-ECB and HT1 markets (scenario 5), in Bt-RW and HT1 markets (scenario 6). In each case, the simulations again assume that the merger leads to a monopoly in the corresponding market (with a market share equal to 1). and on Bt-RW/HT1 stacking seeds (scenario 6c) are not statistically significant.
Finally, scenarios 7-9 consider mergers involving both biotech companies and seed companies (biotech/seed merger). In these scenarios, the simulations assume that the mergers lead to the monopolization in the corresponding biotech trait market. However, since the monopolization of seed companies is unlikely (there are too many seed companies), the mergers in scenarios 7-9 are assumed to increase market concentrations for conventional seed (as measured by the H's and HH's) only to the maximum observed in our sample. How do mergers involving both seed companies and biotech firms affect seed prices? The simulation results reported in Table 6 shows that such mergers can have a statistically significant impact on the price of conventional seed. The simulated effect is up to +$17.94/bag when mergers involve Bt-ECB biotech firms (scenario 7) and +$31.21/bag when the mergers involve HT1 firms (scenario 9). However, our simulations indicate that the effects of such mergers would not be statistically significant when it involves Bt-RW biotech firms. Importantly, note that these simulation results capture cross-market effects contributing to the exercise of market power in the conventional seed market. These cross-market effects play a significant role in the evaluation of the exercise of market power.
The simulations in Table 6 illustrate the potential usefulness of the model in studying the effects of changing market concentrations. For example, in a pre-merger analysis, this would involve evaluating the HHIs and GHHIs in all relevant markets before and after a proposed merger and proceeding with a quantitative assessment of the price effects. Alternatively, the model could be used to estimate the effects of spinoffs by evaluating their anticipated effects on HHIs and GHHIs and by simulating the associated price changes. a Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level. The econometric investigation documents the determinants of seed prices, including the effects of bundling and imperfect competition. It finds evidence of spatial price discrimination. It captures the interactive role of market concentrations and complementarity/substitution. We find strong evidence of sub-additive bundle pricing, thus rejecting standard component pricing. This is consistent with the presence of economies of scope in seed production. Using generalized HHI's, we also document how traditional and cross-market effects of imperfect competition can contribute to higher seed prices. The analysis is used to illustrate how changing market concentrations can affect seed prices.
Concluding remarks
Our analysis could be extended in several directions. First, it would be useful to explore the implications of bundle pricing and imperfect competition in vertical markets. Second, there is a need for empirical investigations of bundle pricing analyzed jointly with bundling decisions.
Third, it would be useful to estimate the separate effects of supply versus demand factors in bundle pricing. But this would require better data (especially on the supply side) to identify these effects separately. Finally, there is a need to explore empirically the economics of bundling applied to other sectors. These appear to be good topic for further research.
